Anti-narcotics strategy
Editorial
Stabroek News
May 17, 2007
A spectre is haunting Guyana. Narco-trafficking is the insidious force driving this country's high rates of murder, violence and gun-related crimes that are scaring foreign investors, driving away the local educated élite, undermining economic growth, impeding social development and threatening human welfare.
Even before the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and Caribbean Region of the World Bank issued this damning indictment of the impact of the narcotics trade in their report entitled Crime, Violence and Development: Trends, Costs and Policy Options in the Caribbean in early May, the US Department of State's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report disclosed in early March that the Govern-ment of Guyana had yet to implement important initiatives of its National Drug Strategy Master Plan, 2005-2009 that was launched nearly two years ago in June 2005.
Admitting that some aspects of the anti-narcotics strategy had not been implemented, Minister of Home Affairs Mr Clement Rohee dismissed US claims that the government was inactive in the fight against narco-trafficking. He declared that "ninety percent" of the plan's first-year target had been achieved and promised that the government "will be aggressively pursuing implementation of several important aspects of the five-year programme during this year."
In this light, the high-profile public ceremony to install a high-level inter-agency task force - comprising the heads of the Guyana Revenue Authority, Guyana Defence Force, Guyana Police Force, Financial Intelligence Unit, Coast Guard and the Customs Anti-Narcotics Unit - must be seen as one of those initiatives. This new task force is meant to focus on sharing information and intelligence in order to direct, coordinate and advise on law enforcement operations in relation to the narcotics trade and trafficking in illegal weapons. But can it?
The National Drug Strategy Master Plan's admirable aim is to foster institutional, participatory and democratic approaches to the achievement of a crime-free country founded on social justice, rule of law and respect for authority. But two years after the strategy has been promulgated, little of it is in place and the dream of a crime-free country remains illusory.
The chief executive of the strategy's main organ - the National Anti-Narcotics Co-ordinating Secretariat - has not yet been appointed and the secretariat itself is not operational. Nor do its principal arms - the National Anti-Narcotics Commis-sion, chaired by the president himself; the Joint Intelligence Co-ordination Centre; the Joint Anti-Narcotics Committee; and the several Regional Anti-Drugs Units - function in the way the strategy dictates. In fact, the architecture which must form the framework for the entire strategy is still to be erected. How can information be provided to the superstructure of a new inter-agency task force when the infrastructure of a coordinating secretariat, joint centres and regional units is not yet in place?
The US annual international report correctly stated that there is little productive interaction or intelligence sharing and the Joint Intelligence Coordination Centre "is not currently operational." Even the country's main existing anti-narcotics agency - CANU - does not have sufficient staff and resources to secure the country's main legal international transit points much less the numerous unofficial and illegal transit points on the Brazil, Suriname and Venezuela borders. If the anti-narcotics structure falters at the local level, the inter-agency task force will fail at the national level.
Rattling off statistics of the hundreds of persons prosecuted for petty ganja-related offences and the thousands of kilogrammes of cannabis plants and leaves destroyed is an unconvincing rejoinder to the criticisms of foreign governments and international institutions of the administration's lethargic implementation of its own anti-narcotics strategy.
Mr Rohee seems to think that the signing of the memorandum of understanding to create the inter-agency task force would send a "strong signal" to the neighbouring states - Brazil, Suriname and Vene-zuela - and to the multilateral agencies of the administration's commitment to the fight against narco-trafficking. That is unlikely.
At this time, unless the staff and resources that are required, and the structures and systems that have been prescribed, are implemented, the strategy cannot become functional and no serious person will expect it to have a real impact on rampant trafficking. Much more than a strong signal is necessary!