Presidential assent Editorial
Stabroek News
February 4, 2007

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In our edition of December 31 we reported on the fact that ten bills passed by the National Assembly had not been assented to by President Jagdeo, and today on page 3, we have a follow-up [please note: link provided by LOSP] to that story. Under the constitution before a bill can become law, the President has to give his assent. If he has difficulty with a bill and decides to withhold his assent, he must return it to the Speaker within 21 days stating his reasons. As we have explained in today's report, once that happens, within six months the House must pass a motion on the bill by a two-thirds majority before it can be returned to the head of state again for signature. Following that he has ninety days in which to assent. In other words he can delay a bill becoming law, but cannot prevent it doing so if two-thirds of the National Assembly is determined it should be law.

In the case of the ten bills in question President Jagdeo has neither assented to them nor formally refused his assent by returning them to the Speaker with his reasons; he has simply done nothing. They were passed by the National Assembly between March 16 and April 27 last year and should have been signed into law before Parliament was dissolved on May 2, because otherwise they would automatically become invalid. As it is, that is precisely what has happened, and in order for them to enter the statute books now, the whole legislative process would have to begin again from scratch.

In case anyone thinks that these were particularly contentious bills, they were not; the opposition did not obstruct their passage. In fact, prima facie, they appeared to contain provisions which could only be of benefit to the general public. Our consumer contributor, Ms Eileen Cox, has made reference in more than one of her columns to the importance of the Consumer Protection Bill 2006, which has now been consigned to limbo as a consequence of the head of state's inaction. Even more inexplicable is the fact that these were all government bills; why, one can only ask, should the President by default be quashing proposed legislation presented to the National Assembly by his own administration?

If it is that he thinks there should be a delay in the coming into force of these various statutes, then the answer is contained in a quote from Sir Michael Davies's report in our story today, saying that in that case a commencement clause should be included in the law in question. Certainly a busy schedule cannot be the head of state's excuse; exactly how long does it take to sign ten bills? And he surely cannot argue that he needed more time to peruse them all before giving his assent; as the head of government does he not know the contents of the bills his ministers have presented in Parliament, and how these have fared there and any amendments which might have been made? If he does not, then it would be to admit he doesn't have a grip on his cabinet or his administration. This, however, is not a credible thesis; the public perception of him at least, is of a micro-manager.

One is left, therefore, with two possibilities: either he or his staff is so disorganized that the bills got overlooked, or else they contain clauses with which he is uncomfortable. The first possibility seems distinctly remote, so once that is excluded it leaves the second hypothesis. However, as said above, there is a provision in the constitution dealing with how the President should respond when he has a difficulty with a bill, and that does not appear to have been followed.

Whatever his reason for not adhering to article 170 of the constitution in this instance, as we reported today, Sir Michael Davies was clear on the consequences: "…it is a negation of Parliamentary government," he wrote, "for the stated will of the legislature to be delayed."

One presumes that the ten bills will be laid again in Parliament either as they are or with some amendments. After all, they are not minor pieces of legislation, including as they do (among others) the Employment of Young Persons and Children (Amendment) Bill, and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Bill. The latter, as its name suggests, provides for co-operation between Guyana and other states in criminal cases. If they are tabled once more, they will have to go through the usual readings, representing a waste of parliamentary time in what is normally a crowded legislative schedule.

Guyana is a parliamentary democracy, and the President's powers are circumscribed. It may be that because this will be his final term in office, Mr Jagdeo is a man in a hurry and is impatient with the protracted procedures inherent to any truly democratic system. But there are no short cuts. This is not Venezuela where the President will be handed an Enabling Law by the National Assembly to rule by decree for eighteen months. Here legislative acts require the co-operation of the National Assembly and the President, with the greater power in this regard residing with the National Assembly. Mr Jagdeo cannot think that it is a matter of little importance if he does not adhere to the letter and the spirit of the constitution; it is that constitution which underpins democracy here, and provides the framework which gives him legitimacy. If one part of it is ignored or bypassed, then the constitution as a whole is undermined and along with it, democratic practice in Guyana.

In a parliamentary democracy nobody is above the constitution: not ordinary citizens, not members of political parties; not ministers of government; and not presidents either. If they were, then the form of government in place would have another name from the one we know.