Desmond Hoyte and the International community By RM Austin
Stabroek News
December 24, 2006

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It is usually claimed that it was Jimmy Carter who compelled or persuaded Desmond Hoyte to make wide ranging changes to the electoral system and paved the way for the promotion of democratic practice when he came to Guyana to observe the 1992 General Elections. This is not entirely accurate. Such a view ignores the role that Desmond Hoyte himself played in building a democratic culture in Guyana.

This controversial notion does not take account of the dynamics of the internal situation within the People's National Congress (PNC). Important forces within the Party had come to the understanding that Guyana needed a breathing space to undertake a major economic transformation in order for it to survive. Hoyte himself had been so persuaded even before he had acceded to the highest political office in the land. Not long after he was sworn in as President, Desmond Hoyte informed his Cabinet and later the Central Committee that the PNC could lose the next election. If it was necessary the Party will have to undergo a period as the opposition. He repeated these views, in my view, with greater force during the 1986 Heads of Mission Conference.

Contrary to the popular view, Mr. Hoyte recognised that the circumstances in which he inherited the Presidency were difficult and problematic. It simply could not be political business as usual. Hoyte had been reading the international situation very well for as long as he had been in government and realised that in order for Guyana to restore some balance to the economy there had to be reconciliation with the principal western states. That is the reason why during the funeral of the Founder Leader, he did not hesitate to meet with senior American officials. It did not take him long thereafter to put relations with Canada and the United Kingdom on an even keel. Desmond Hoyte was setting the diplomatic conditions in which he could pursue his economic recovery programme without the impediment of fractious relations with these important countries.

Also, he was hearing from significant sources that Guyana's electoral problems could no longer be tolerated. Caricom was the first major international organisation to register its concern with the Hoyte Administration about the problem of elections in Guyana. After the 1985 Elections, Desmond Hoyte was invited to a Summit Conference in Mustique with several leaders of the community, including John Compton and Eugenia Charles. These leaders spelled out in no uncertain terms that there had to be reform which could remove the continuous complaints about the country's electoral system. Desmond Hoyte could not ignore their pleadings, or to be more accurate, their warnings. The seriousness of the situation was therefore brought home to him. After this meeting, I tried to engage him on what had transpired at the Summit but he was vague and laconic. All that he would allow was that he had given certain undertakings with regard to the requirements for democracy in Guyana but was not prepared "to tip his hand."

As part of the delegation to Venezuela in 1990, I was able to see at first hand how Guyana's electoral problems had become a matter of interest and a focal point for some kind of resolution on the part of the international community. It was a lesson in international relations that I will not forget. The constant criticism and attacks on the electoral system in Guyana had had the cumulative effect of sensitizing important statesmen and states to the internal situation in Guyana, which is increasingly viewed as being dysfunctional. During that same visit, in a meeting with a tanned and surprisingly energetic Carlos Andres Perez, the Latin American statesman, without regard for protocol or the sensitivity of his interlocutors, told us bluntly that Guyana's elections "had become a problem." Coming from such a prestigious international figure such a statement could not be ignored. Clearly, Mr. Perez was not merely reflecting the views of his government but also the democratic community of Latin America.

I remember too that I was asked to prepare Mr. Hoyte's state visit to Brazil in 1991. It was also during the course of the discussions with officials of this Latin American state that it was communicated to me in no uncertain terms that the outcome of the next elections in Guyana had to be consistent with the norms of democratic governance. The bluntness of the advice was somewhat surprising as Brazil's traditional policy was one not interfering in the internal affairs of states. Something had happened which had compelled the Brazilians to engage in diplomatic behaviour which appeared to be out of character with their approach to questions affecting neighbouring states. This too could not be ignored.

I have a clear recollection of briefing Mr. Hoyte extensively about what had been said by Carlos Andres Perez and the Brazilians when I visited these two countries. I had done so at a Cabinet meeting and later at greater leisure and over a greater length of time at his home. By this time he was far advanced in the construction of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and there was no need to state the obvious fact that reform in the economy had to be accompanied by the restoration of democracy. This was necessary if Guyana was to rejoin the community of nations and to pursue its economic interests without the constant diplomatic buffeting which had been the lot of this country for close to two decades.

There was also one other fact that could not be denied. The international financial organisations which were being asked to provide loans and grants to buttress the ERP had increasingly made it known that democratic practice was a condition for such loans and grants. Hoyte also knew this very well. He had had contact with the heads of these organisations and even though I cannot be sure about this, I am certain that Guyana's electoral system would have been the subject of discussion.

Taken altogether therefore, Desmond Hoyte was facing a situation in which all of the main players in the international system had reached a consensus that a democratic Guyana was a desideratum for further financial support and its continued presence in the international community.