More information has now been made available by the Guyana Water Incorporated (GWI) about its efforts to assist in battling the inferno that devoured three big businesses on Hadfield and Lombard streets on November 13. In a nutshell, GWI pointed out that in support of water conservation its pumping hours in Georgetown are 5 am to midday and 5 pm to 10 pm. It says that at 10.50 pm (the fire is generally accepted to have started a few minutes before 10 pm) on the night in question its security officer at the Shelter Belt recorded a report from the Guyana Fire Service about the fire at Royal Castle. The report was immediately passed on to the duty operator who opened the fire valve and closed off the connections to the Kitty distribution system. GWI says that within 10 minutes, approximately 11 pm, the water pressure to the part of the city being ravaged by the fire was 20 pounds per square inch which is the normal fire-fighting requirement.
On another vexed issue, GWI reported that of the seven fire hydrants in the vicinity of Royal Castle, six were tested and found to be in good working order while one was not functioning because of damage done to it by a vehicle.
The GWI account helps to refocus the debate on the GFS and its preparedness to combat major fires.
1) Can the GFS really explain why it took around one hour to notify GWI that a dangerous fire had broken out and an increased water pressure was needed? Remember the fire service is literally a stone's throw away from the Royal Castle site and from all accounts there was a tremendous racket at the point the utility pole was hit by a truck and a blaze started. Onlookers started to shout for fire and there was a veritable commotion Guyanese-style. Firemen would have immediately heard the reports of the fire and those detailed to action would have proceeded to the scene while others would have triggered the various alerts and alarms within the system. The Fire Chief, Carlyle Washington, in his defence of the GFS in a Government Information Agency (GINA) release had said that the telephone system in the area had been disrupted so that a vehicle had to be sent sometime after the fire to the shelter belt. It is an unconvincing argument. Water is the lifeblood of the firefight. Knowing full well of GWI's reduced pumping hours, the first thing that should be done in a calm, organised fire service is to contact GWI immediately and at the appropriate level. If the landline system is down, the fire service should have resorted to the cellular system. If that didn't work, a fireman with the requisite authority jumps into a vehicle and hightails it down Church Street to the Shelter Belt - all of ten minutes at the most - not an hour. The loss of those crucial minutes was most likely the difference between containing the fire to Royal Castle and having it advance dangerously in all directions.
2) If as GWI says a fire-fighting supply of water was available from 11 pm in the hydrants why did the GFS rely on a pump contraption drawing water from the Demerara River? By GWI's accounts, any one of six hydrants near to Royal Castle could have been pressed into use and would have been more convenient to fight the fires that eventually spread to Auto Supplies and Mohammed's and threatened the former GNCB headquarters and Parliament Buildings. In the GINA release, Mr Washington says that three tenders were at the scene together with a Land Rover from Guysuco's LBI sugar estate. When their water supplies were exhausted, the Land Rover from LBI headed to the South Road canal to pump water and the fire chief says that since the water pressure was too low in the hydrants then recourse had to be sought to the Demerara River. Simultaneously, he said a vehicle was dispatched to the shelter belt to have the water pressure increased. Something doesn't quite gel here. A land rover from LBI, a good way from Georgetown, was notified of the fire in the city, got down to the scene of the blaze, exhausted a supply of 2,000 gallons of water, then headed to the South Road canal to pump water all before GWI was asked by the fire service to increase its pressure? Did the GFS utilise any of the hydrants after the water pressure was raised by GWI? As we have said in previous editorials, there is a great deal more that has to be explained by the GFS and preferably not through GINA.
3) GWI says in its release on the hydrants around Royal Castle that "activities of vandals had made the operation of hydrants more difficult than usual and considerable cleaning was necessary before they could be made effective". Who is responsible for the regular checking and upkeep of hydrants and how often is this done? It is shocking that a hydrant quite near to the fire service headquarters was not functioning and others needed considerable cleaning to be really effective. It should be apparent to all that if fire hydrants are indispensable in fighting fires then their management and upkeep should be in the bailiwick of the GFS. In days gone by the fire service could routinely be seen opening up the hydrants checking for water flows and blockages etc. When last has anyone seen the fire service so engaged? If the hydrants not far from the fire service headquarters are in this state shouldn't the rest of the city be panicking about theirs and employing their plumbers to check the hydrants in the vicinity of their dwellings?
Many other questions remain unanswered. Mr Washington says that the firefight was delayed for fear that live wires could lead to electrocutions. When was the Guyana Power and Light (GPL) notified of the blaze and how soon after did it de-energise the area?
The conflagration of November 13 has led to losses estimated by some to be in the vicinity of $1B and nearly two hundred jobs have been jeopardised. It is an all too familiar scene: major fire, major losses, major questions.
The fire service is expected to come in for consideration eventually under the mandate given to the Disciplined Forces Commission (DFC) but there is good reason for immediate attention to be placed by the DFC and the Ministry of Home Affairs on operational issues and the performance of the fire service at the scene of this fire. First and foremost, the GFS and the ministry should explain in detail what the GFS' early warning system is for getting outlying fire tenders, GWI, GPL, the police force and the army in touch with fire emergencies and how it functioned in this instance. There doesn't appear to be a viable one where designated personnel are available in each organisation 24 hours per day for emergencies and neither does there seem to be a fall-back mode of communication when landline telephones fail.
Second, did the GFS have sufficient equipment and personnel at the scene and did it fight the good fight. Onlookers, observers and the owners of the properties destroyed have had nothing but scathing criticisms of the GFS. It has been a longstanding problem and in this instance may have resulted in more damage than should have been done.
Third, what about the new tenders that were acquired not so long ago and paraded with such fanfare before donor, donee and the public? These tenders came with a hoist that allowed elevation and the ability to fight fires from all angles. What became of these tenders on November 13?
The Ministry of Home Affairs and the GFS need to face the public to provide answers to these questions. A refreshing and admirable example is being set by the Guyana Civil Aviation Authority. In its previous incarnation it was impenetrable and hardly accessible to the public on aviation disasters. Since the crash of the Skyvan the new civil aviation authority has held press conferences, made itself available for questions, provided interim information, answered critics and promised to release its report to the public. The GFS by comparison has a far way to go.