There is much at stake in the potential exploration of the Guiana Basin for oil

By Raphael Trotman

Stabroek News

July 19, 2003


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Mr Raphael Trotman and Mr Khemraj Ramjattan do a monthly column for Stabroek News on topics of their choice. Mr Ramjattan’s column will appear later this month.

It has been three years since Guyana suffered the ignominy of having the CGX oil rig booted out of the Eagle well site in what was regarded as a classic display of gunboat diplomacy practiced by the Surinamese. My views on this mess up are well known and need not be repeated. What is of interest now however is the progress or lack thereof made over the past three years in resolving the issues surrounding the eviction. There is too much at stake to simply allow this matter to be given passive attention.

The quantity of oil in the Guiana Basin is estimated to be in excess of 15 billion barrels as based on a recent U.S. government seismic survey. This wealth has to be exploited and in fact could be the catalyst that Guyana needs to finally remove it from the economic doldrums. It would give us a quantum kick into the 21st Century. There is no alternative to exploitation of this resource.

From time to time we are informed via the news media that there is a meeting of Border Commissions in Georgetown or Paramaribo. During, and after these meetings, we invariably learn that some Surinamese state official has done something which raises questions about their commitment to the talks. It is either the publication of a map with the New River Triangle annexed or a statement made by a Foreign Ministry official refuting or contradicting some statement made by our distinguished Foreign Minister.

Quite frankly we the citizens are unsure as to the progress that this Commission is making. It is easy to say that the absence of conflict is progress enough but our expectations go beyond crisis management and containment. Seasoned diplomats may wish to say that these matters cannot be rushed but have to be caressed and coaxed into agreement and with this I cannot disagree. Guyana on the other hand suffers from a huge disadvantage, which makes any negotiations asymmetrical and therefore weighed against us. For one thing, Suriname retains the victory of having the exploration ceased. Marked on a score sheet, it reads Suriname 1 Guyana 0. Secondly, the Surinamese have utilized their good diplomatic skills to have the issue bound up in protracted negotiations while the value of the oil remains constant and even shows an increase from time to time. In the language of negotiators, Suriname’s Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is to have the oil remain right where it is and gather interest like money in a bank. The long-term loser is going to be Guyana. We need to have an equalizer so that Suriname’s position starts to shift from one whereby they feel that the best position to adopt is to secure the wealth and sit on it indefinitely. Time is not on our side.

The composition of Guyana’s representation on the Commission is beyond reproach and so one has to be careful about second-guessing or questioning their competencies. It is quite clear however that Guyana has to enhance its diplomatic thrust whilst ensuring that the military support is ever present. In terms of the diplomatic initiative, Guyana must continue to utilize the mechanism of bilateral negotiations to improve the chances of a negotiated settlement. Suriname must be made to understand that there are enough resources to benefit both nations many times over. The prospects for Suriname need therefore to be sweetened by an irresistible offer. At the multilateral level one would expect that CARICOM would play a greater role in settling this issue. The efforts of the facilitator Prime Minister Patterson floundered and have not been picked up since 2000. It is time that Guyana uses its influence as a long-standing member of CARICOM to bring this matter onto the agenda for discussion and resolution.

The CARICOM heads have just concluded another meeting and reiterated the usual statements and promises of greater cooperation and integration. CARICOM has to move beyond words and platitudes to be able to provide tangible benefits to the citizens who are in the various member countries. For Guyana, one of our burning issues is the fact that another CARICOM nation used force to influence an outcome three years ago and that outcome remains extant. This matter may one day find itself in the CCJ but hopefully the CARICOM heads can expand the Regional Negotiating Machinery to include intra-regional problem solving. Internal and inter-regional political crises are becoming more frequent and several states within the region have touchy issues other than Suriname and Guyana. To some extent Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados have disagreements over territorial sea and fishing rights. Venezuela is also laying claim to a huge swath of Caribbean Sea. In these circumstances, establishing a problem solving permanent task force is an imperative.

Lastly, we may one day have to bite the bullet and give careful consideration to the route of international arbitration. Barring the intervention of a person of Sir Shridath Ramphal’s competence and stature doing for us what he did for Belize, we may have to submit to a process that forces a decision on both parties. There should be simultaneous preparation for all the options.

Militarily, Guyana has to do more than have irregular patrols of the GDFS Essequibo up the Corentyne River. It was Suriname after all, which took this matter outside of the realms of diplomacy and introduced the role of force. We must therefore be ever mindful that this is the mindset that underpins the tactics of the negotiations they have with Guyana. Suriname would have calculated that Guyana was militarily weak in June 2000 and therefore they made the preemptive move to safeguard “their” vital interests.

Recently, Suriname invested in eight new gunboats purchased from Holland and their military ties with China and Brazil have been strengthened. Where are we comparatively? Since July 2000 to now our GDF has been consumed with internal security concerns and must have been perceived to be incapable of addressing all matters at once. While we know this perception to be misplaced, it is still necessary to demonstrate capacity and ability from time to time. All of the promises made by the Government within the last twelve months for resources to be given to the GDF have been in the context of national security. The matter of the recapitalisation of the army addressed by the Border/National Security Committees has to be given attention.

The Guyana Government signed the Ship-Rider agreement/treaty with the United States in April 2001, with the expectation that we would receive military aid in the form of substantial amounts of material and training. In the context of maritime capability, what in fact we received were four small craft not suitable for the task of patrol and interdiction as is a fast and sturdier patrol boat. We are indeed grateful but we cannot expect the US to assist us in strengthening. We are not at all preaching war as this is counter to the culture of Guyanese but not to be prepared for the eventuality of having to defend our interests could prove fatal. That said however, every resource must be adopted to ensure that the military crisis we faced in June and July 2000 does not repeat itself. Guyana has to display that we prefer the peaceful and more sensible option of negotiation.

We wish the Commission every success but at the same time the Guyanese public requires frequent reports and steady progress towards the resolution of this matter. The manner of handling the Venezuelan issue for example cannot be the same as that with Suriname though we cannot ignore the inter-connectedness of the two. With Venezuela the solution favours a more protracted engagement with regular meetings and deepening relations at every level. With Suriname on the other hand given historical considerations and current realities of buried treasure and wounded pride, we cannot afford to wait forever. What happens if Suriname licenses exploration in the same area; will the Guyana government react in the same way the Surinamese did to our exploration? Guyana and Suriname have to strengthen their relationship and put away age-old suspicions and cultural biases. Commonsense behoves us to find a workable solution, which very well may lie in joint exploration. The alternative is nothing pretty and is a picture of economic and social gloom for both nations.