Military operations
Editorial
Stabroek News
October 4, 2002
When the Guyana Defence Force launched its security operation four months ago, there was a wave of expectation that the upsurge of criminal activity would be quelled, the public would be protected from violent attacks and life in this troubled country would return to normal. Citizens waited for peace and safety. They are still waiting.
Criminals still kill at will. Copycat crimes have occurred in places as distant as Vergenoegen, Rose Hall, New Amsterdam, Linden and Georgetown. Instead of being ameliorated, the situation has deteriorated, even in the area supposedly under military occupation. What went wrong?
‘Operation Tourniquet’ was presented to the public largely as a military operation at the briefing in Camp Ayanganna by Lt Col Andrew Pompey on 5 June.
Although this may not have been the intention, that impression was reinforced by the absence of a strong police presence and participation. It seemed to the public that the police was free to continue its normal duties. The Tactical Service Unit (TSU) remained mostly in its Eve Leary depot while a GDF unit established a Buxton garrison from which patrols went forth.
A large portion of the country’s security forces is now based in a small area of about 15 kilometres from Eve Leary and Ayanganna to Buxton, leaving a small portion of the security forces to cover large vulnerable areas, a fact that the criminals quickly discovered.
The military purpose of the operation, also, may have differed from public expectation. According to Commander (Coast Guard) Gary Best, addressing the National Steering Committee on Crime public consultation at UG on 9 September (see SN September 12,2002), “Operation Tourniquet...sought to form an alliance with law-abiding citizens through sustained patrols, road blocks and other military activities, in order to create an unfavourable environment for criminal activities in the area”, suggesting that, as a result, “criminals would feel uncomfortable in the area and try to relocate, thus rendering themselves vulnerable to detection and apprehension”.
Even if the GDF were to succeed in its stated mission, it seemed to have no mandate to actually arrest criminals and take other action to bring the crime wave to an end. That, clearly, always remained a GPF responsibility, emphasising the necessity for the two forces to operate jointly.
Apart from President Bharrat Jagdeo’s all too frequent ‘emergency sessions’ with the military and police ‘top brass’ after particularly bloody rounds of killing, the co-ordination of the operation seems unclear. It was expected, at least, that the GPF’s Deputy Commissioner Winston Felix, who is in charge of police operations, and the GDF’s Colonel Edward Collins who is in charge of military operations, would have been seen to be directing what is certainly the most perilous and prolonged internal security campaign for several decades. That, at least, would have created the impression of joint military-police operations.
Instead, rather than directing anti-crime operations from the start of this crisis, Felix was appointed to head a team to administer the Police reform programme. In August, the President had to order that Felix be sent overseas on a quartermaster’s shopping trip to buy some standard safety equipment which had been recommended years ago.
In the final analysis, it is the Police Force, not the Defence Force, which has specific responsibility under the Police Act for “The prevention and detection of crime; the preservation of law and order; the preservation of the peace; the repression of internal disturbance; the protection of property; the apprehension of offenders; and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which it is directly charged...”
Although the Defence Force has general responsibility under the Defence Act for the ‘maintenance of order’, it performs that role only in support of the Police which is equipped with branches such as the Special Branch to provide intelligence, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to conduct investigations, and the Tactical Service Unit (TSU) to conduct operations, assisted by its other agencies and departments.
With all its faults, the Police Force is immeasurably superior to the Defence Force in the field of law enforcement and it would be a mistake to think that the two forces are interchangeable, or worse, that a regular army could conduct a major anti-crime campaign either on its own, or without the conspicuous and continuous co-operation of the police. Further, the law gives certain powers, and training imparts certain prowess, to policemen to arrest, search, interrogate and prosecute which soldiers do not possess. In this regard, the joint GDF-GPF cordon and search in the southern zone of Buxton village last weekend was a welcome tactical improvement in the anti-crime campaign, although there were few tangible results.
The GDF and GPF have operated jointly on several occasions in the past, usually after a prolonged period of joint training, the setting up of joint operations centres; joint decision-making and direction; the co-location of troops with policemen in police compounds and, most of all, a clear definition and separation of duties and roles.
The first noticeable deviation from this smooth inter-service co-ordination was the notorious siege of the Toucan Guest House in February 2000 resulting in the killing of fugitive Linden London and his girlfriend.
It is hoped that Operation Tourniquet would not be the second.