The Coast Guard's recent seizure of two 12-metre wooden boats which were transporting over 50,000 litres of gasoline in drums, and an undetermined amount in tanks, was a relatively rare occurrence in maritime law enforcement. The boats seemed to have been custom-built for the contraband traffic from Venezuela, and fuel is only one of a variety of commodities that enter Guyana illegally, evading customs duties.
Cross-border contraband trade has thrived for over two decades since the onset of the economic depression under the PNC Administration. During that period, the underground economy expanded to include not only smuggling but also illegal migration ('backtracking'); narco-trafficking; gold-smuggling; foreign currency dealing and a bit of gun-running, all becoming entrenched economic enterprises with a new shady class of entrepreneurs. Some resourceful businessmen also introduced a new form of 'transit trade' in which they financed the legitimate purchase and importation of goods from Europe and elsewhere into Suriname where they paid low tariffs then brought them illegally into Guyana where they paid no tariffs.
Apart from commodity smuggling, thousands of Guyanese migrated, often without documents, to work and settle in centres such as Nickerie in Suriname, Boa Vista in Brazil and San Felix and Puerto Ordaz in Venezuela. Recently, the magistrates' courts in the Corentyne were overwhelmed by the large number of deportees from Suriname in one of that country's periodic purges of undocumented and undesirable Guyanese.
Guyana has over 2,500km of borders and coastline and, if Georgetown has difficulty in collecting taxes and enforcing the law in populated areas where at least there is some infrastructure, its writ hardly runs in the long stretches of jungle, savannah and mountain where poorly-paid officials fear to tread.
It has now become difficult to control, much less abolish, these contraband practices, notwithstanding ad hoc measures such as the establishment of the Berbice Anti-Smuggling Squad (BASS) and desultory patrols by the Coast Guard. The cost of frontier lawlessness has been heavy, not only in terms of confusion and contradiction among the various regulatory agencies, authorities, ministries, departments, and law-enforcement services but also in lost revenue, the upsurge in maritime piracy, and the flight of legitimate investment.
These conditions have made it difficult for Guyana's small, hardworking embassies in Caracas, Paramaribo and Brasilia to cope with the numerous problems caused by the thousands of undocumented citizens, some of whom break the laws of their host countries.
Nationals have to be represented by legal counsel if charged with offences; their families have to be cared for; and they may have to be evacuated and repatriated when host governments launch 'campaigns' against illegal aliens as seems to be happening now in Western Suriname. Protecting the lives, and promoting the well-being, of nationals have became almost as important as, if not more time-consuming than, projecting a favourable image of Guyana in neighbouring countries.
These daily and demanding chores distract our embassies from legitimate economic and strategic diplomacy, arguably the main purpose of their being in those capitals.
There is much to gain from having orderly and well-regulated, as opposed to unruly and lawless, frontiers. On the one hand, the Government could consider establishing consulates near the centres of Guyanese settlement in San Felix (Venezuela) Nickerie (Suriname), and Boa Vista (Brazil) as diplomatic sub-stations. On the other hand, there is an urgent need to re-equip local law-enforcement agencies to enable them to regularise (i.e., legalise) the movement of goods and people.
Once established, these consulates and a credible law-enforcemant system could contribute to promoting legitimate commerce and hassle-free travel for our citizens.