It is a pity that the debate about the role of the army in the current crisis has gone into the political arena, because it means that the practical and technical issues which would ordinarily inform decisions on the matter have become contaminated by partisan considerations. Certainly it is not worth the Government's while responding to critics in such a high decibel fashion, since by so doing it closes off its own options should it want to change strategic direction some time in the near future.
Perhaps the first thing that has to be said is that despite what the administration might appear to believe, it is not in the interest of any of the parliamentary parties - whatever their past statements and whatever their associations with other forms of lawlessness might have been - to allow banditry to so undermine the structures of the state that it is plunged into anarchy. If that happened, none of the parties as currently constituted would be the ones to inherit the earth (or what would be left of it). It is worth remembering too that the current crime situation is affecting everyone's constituency, although it remains true that Indians are more at risk than anyone else, and that the Indians of the lower East Coast are particularly vulnerable.
Let us accept the premise, therefore, that even if the atmosphere between the two main parties is so polluted that they have not risen to the challenge of officially articulating a common position on crime, nevertheless, in principle neither party, qua party, is seeking a nihilistic outcome to the present crisis. This doesn't mean to say that as usual, the equation does not have political elements in it; however, that notwithstanding, the primary questions which have to be answered are simply whether that deployment has been effective, and if it hasn't been effective whether it is necessary at all, or if it is necessary whether it could be made far more effective.
Where the first question is concerned, it must be acknowledged that the military's presence in the Buxton area has not produced the results which might have been hoped, and no amount of expostulating on the Government's part will alter that fact. (In case the administration has any doubts on this score, it should ask the residents of Annandale what they think.) Of course, it might choose to argue that if the army had not been there, things would have been much worse, and that may well be true. However, if it could be demonstrated that a different approach might have produced better results, then that argument would have no status.
The reasons for the modest achievements of the GDF in securing Buxton and its environs are not far to seek. Among other things, it has been pointed out on more than one occasion - most recently in a letter in Friday's edition of this newspaper - that the army does not have the powers of the police. Normally such powers are conferred only under a state of emergency, and as of now, no state of emergency at any level has been declared. What we have, therefore, are soldiers being required to undertake police functions with their hands tied behind their backs, so to speak.
At a discussion session organized by the Guyana Human Rights Association the week before last, Mr David Granger, a retired Brigadier, made some other observations, several of which did not deserve the perfunctory dismissal they received from Government spokesmen. As reported in our Monday edition, he said, for instance, that army personnel were not trained to solve crimes, and that the military was being sucked into a bundle of confusion on the East Coast. The entire GDF exercise was not clear cut, he continued, and there were no joint operations between the police and the military as evidenced by the virtual absence of a police presence on the recent patrols.
Furthermore, he alluded to the fact that while soldiers were confined, officers of the police force were going home to their families or stopping vehicles for comparatively trivial offences, such as tinted windows. They were not stopping and searching vehicles or cordoning off areas looking for the escapees.
It is obvious to those even without Mr Granger's security expertise, that there is a lack of clarity in the entire East Coast operation. And it is also obvious even to those lacking his security expertise that the kind of deployment which exists now is not good for the army, not good for the police force, not good for the country and not good for the Government.
The duration of the exercise, the muddle surrounding its specific objectives as opposed to its general aim of improving the security of citizens, the relative impotence of the GDF personnel to radically change the situation, will all contribute to the demoralisation of the army. In addition, as long as the GDF is functioning in the absence of detailed plans for joint operations with the GPF, the latter will tend to leave everything to the military, even although soldiers are simply not trained, as Mr Granger said, neither empowered, to discharge the functions of police personnel.
An army which appears comparatively unsuccessful in its operations, eventually loses the respect of the populace - a dangerous development in our circumstances, where as things stand there is so little public confidence in the Guyana Police Force. And if the people come to lose confidence in the army too, then the Government will find itself totally exposed from a security point of view, and by extension, so will the country. Surely that is something the authorities would choose to avoid.
If it can be concluded that the present exercise is misconceived, then the question of what should replace it is more difficult to answer. That the Government has to address the matter of disarming Buxton sooner rather than later is clear to even the most uninformed observer. If it decides after consultations with all those who have knowledge in the field - whether party supporters or otherwise - that the situation indeed requires that the army be given a role in that, then the operation should be limited in scope as well as being quick. It should also have specific, clearly delineated goals, and be conducted in the context of at least a limited state of emergency which would leave no grey areas about responsibilities and the command structure. (In the context of a state of emergency, as Mr Cyril Walker pointed out in his letter on Friday, army authority supersedes that of the police.) When the exercise is over, the GDF should return to barracks.
The Government has set up crime consultations to invite opinions on managing the crime situation. If it is serious about consultation, then it cannot be so hostile to criticisms of its decisions, and suggestions about approaches which might be contrary to its view, no matter from which source or forum these emanate. Let it be said again, all rational people in this country want the banditry stopped.