Tilting the balance Editorial
Stabroek News
May 8, 2002

Related Links: Articles on dialogue
Letters Menu Archival Menu

With the publication of letters exchanged and the statements made by President Bharrat Jagdeo and the Leader of the Opposition Desmond Hoyte on the state of the dialogue process one is in a position to make at least preliminary judgements.

Progress in implementation appears to have been uneven and patchy. While there has been for example remarkable advance in the appointment of Opposition nominees to Boards and Committees (some 80% but this does not take account of the weightiness or otherwise of the bodies on which appointments are still to be made) in other areas there has been inexplicable delay e.g. in the editing and publishing of the Report of the Committee on Borders and National Security. It seems that it is not so much that there has been neglect, only that these matters are seemingly being treated as additions to the daily ministerial chores rather than as highly sensitive political issues requiring special attention. It is too easy to forget that the dialogue was the way out of a situation of conflict and disorder which threatened national stability.

Nevertheless the shortcomings in implementation might not have been sufficient grounds for breaking off the dialogue except that one side clearly saw the pace of implementation as part of a wider situation of protest and which included importantly the impasse in parliament which hovers on the edge of constitutional crisis. Consequently the resumption of the dialogue process must clearly be responsive to a wider range of discussion between President Jagdeo and Mr Hoyte, as indeed it is understood the President has suggested. In this connection the efforts of the Cabinet and the Presidential Secretariat to resolve, partly outside the constitutional framework, the deadlock in the appointment of some of the Service and other Commissions are likely to exacerbate an already confrontational situation. The dialogue should be resumed and put on a permanent basis as soon as possible not only because it is a mechanism which promotes consensus in place of conflict but because it responds to some extent to a major flaw or structural weakness in the Guyana constitution which may be described as follows. In terms of a parliamentary system of government the removal of the Head of Government (usually designated Prime Minister) from the legislative body and the establishment of this position separately as President who is both Head of Government and Head of State has in the particular circumstances of the Guyana Constitution left the legislative body in a much diminished position (the existing position of Prime Minister in no way approximates to a Head of Government). Analogies drawn with the US Constitution miss the point. The US Congress is in no sense a creature of the Presidency. The US Congress through its two chambers pursue their own and often different perceptions of the national interest even when the same party, Democratic or Republican, elects the man in the White House, the President.

In the Guyana case membership of the legislature derives only in a very general way from an electorate but far more directly from the party and the individuals who head the list of candidates - and this is so despite the recent gestures made to regional and woman representation.

In terms of the constitution, Ministers derive their positions and power from the President, owing little in consequence to Parliament. Indeed the President can amplify the capacities (or may indeed dilute the character of that body) by appointing outsiders who thereafter sit as Members of Parliament but without a vote.

In a parliamentary system of government, parliament is the crucible in which legitimate "partisan" objectives as articulated by a national party are transmitted in the heat of debate, in which the Opposition plays a full part, into national objectives as reflected in agreed policy or laws. Some of this still happens here, but it is to be noted that the governing party has so to speak a second string to its bow as it can bring powerful influences to bear directly on the President and his Cabinet, before or after matters have been considered in Parliament.

The constitutional lawyer reading the above would doubtless wish to put these and related matters in deeper terms which reflect their complex implications. Put simplistically what exists is not in the usual sense parliamentary government. Parliament is not a body in which sovereignty resides. It is at best a subsidiary body. It is this perception which shapes the attitudes (and will shape the attitudes of any government taking office under this constitution) towards resistance to an Opposition day or question time or the establishment of sectoral scrutiny committees. What business is it in this situation for an opposition member or even one's own backbencher (so runs the feeling) to enquire or criticise matters being pursued from a higher level.

The constitution as it exists reflects once prevalent ideas about the paramountcy of the party. Such ideas it may be contended inhere in the nature of party organisation and it may be or can be a mistake to think that they have been or can be wholly put aside with changes in governments.

A republican constitution did not necessarily require the creation of an Executive President who is both Head of State and Head of Government. It should be recalled that we once had a republician constitution which had a President who had the limited responsibilities of a constitutional monarch and which retained as Head of Government a full fledged Prime Minister who was in the legislature.

India has shown how such constitutional arrangements can provide effective government with a Head of State who in normal circumstances is truly above the political fray. Both Trinidad and Tobago and Dominica have gone that route. The indications are that even anglophile Barbados may opt soon for the monarchical kind of president to cater to growing republican sentiment there.

It may be rightly asked why point now to constitutional flaws when we have already gone through years of constitutional reform, a process still in train. It would indeed be wholly unrealistic to think that such fundamental change as restoring the sovereignty and centrality of parliament could be mooted now with any chance of gaining a momentum.

Yet the structure of the constitution which derogates from the status of Parliament will continue to shape political stances. It is no accident that in the previous administration parliament also met infrequently, questions were ignored and the body treated as little more than a rubber stamp.

Constitutions are amended in a variety of ways. There are amendments to the fundamental law of the constitution such as those now in process, or which flow from legal interpretations. The thrust of several of these current amendments is to curtail the power of the Presidency by limitation in terms of office, by insisting on agreement or meaningful consultation with the leaders of the Opposition in the making of major appointments, by creating a role for parliament in the selection of personnel for service and special commissions etc., all with the aim of tilting the balance back towards parliament. The proposed new committees have a similar objective. But Constitutions can also be amended by the adoption of practices and conventions which with the passage of the years can become as strong and sacrosanct as fundamental law. It is in the context of such possible developments that the following suggestions are made.

First, the dialogue, as it provides linkage between two major foci in a distribution of power not sufficiently reflected in the constitution, should be given constitutional status within parliament with its reports being subject to debate.

Second, the deadlock on the composition of the Parliamentary Management Committee may be resolved by inviting the Speaker (who will have a vote) to chair it. Indeed is not the management of parliament the primary responsibility of the Speaker?

Third,by decision of Parliament the President should be required each year to present a State of Guyana message/report which would be the subject of Parliament's major annual debate. It would be the responsibility of the Speaker to transmit a report on this debate direct to the President with the expectation that there could be a detailed response.

Sometimes the outcome of events tempts one to laughter were it not for its always present tragic aspects. This constitution was drafted by the previous administration, now the main Opposition. When it was promulgated it attracted the sustained hostility of the then Opposition. Now that the party which once opposed is the Government, it has found the constitution comfortable, as comfortable as a well worn pair of shoes.