So President Chavez has gone. Although it was clear that his days were numbered, he went rather more quickly than most people anticipated. And as suddenly as the former President exited from public life, a new interim President - Mr Pedro Carmona - appeared to replace him. Having been sworn in, the new head of state began operating with the dispatch of a businessman (which he is), rather than with the caution of a politician. Mr Chavez had barely settled in to his new, unpresidential quarters in Fuerto Tiume, when Mr Carmona began undoing his life's work. In one fell swoop went the Congress, the Supreme Court and the Attorney General and Comptroller's offices. These, it seems are to be reorganized so they recover their independence and autonomy.

Then the 48 laws which had increased the state's role in the economy were suspended, and the adjective 'Bolivarian' knocked out of Venezuela's official title which now reverts to 'The Republic of Venezuela.'

And as for the oil industry which had set in train the events which had returned Mr Chavez to ordinary citize status, it got back Mr Guaicaipuro Lameda, who had earlier had his services as head of PDVSA, the Venezuelan state oil company, terminated. And all those oil executives who had been dismissed by Mr Chavez too, now found themselves with jobs again. In exchange, the oil industry goes back to work, as does the rest of the country.

President Carmona was not surprisingly sensitive to allegations about the undemocratic nature of the proceedings which had removed an elected President, and replaced him with one who had not received a mandate at the polls. He was therefore quick to promise presidential elections within a year and elections for Congress possibly before that. Presumably these will occur under a reformed constitution, since allusion was made to the legislature amending Mr Chavez' 1999 constitution.

While this transition has been accomplished with apparent expedition and smoothness, this does not mean that there are no obstacles on the horizon. It would seem from a report yesterday that Mr Chavez has not yet put his resignation into writing, and as early as Friday his daughter was claiming from Cuba that he had not resigned at all. Supposing the capricious former head of state has in fact changed his mind, and is going to insist that he is still the President? While in practical terms that might not make much difference to the interim government, it may act as an incentive to his staunchest supporters. Exactly how many of them there are is probably a matter for conjecture, but it should not be assumed that there will not yet be trouble on the streets of Venezuela's cities.

Then there are the legislators, for example, who have suddenly found themselves without an institution. Those still loyal to the former President are not likely to lapse into silence. One of them, Ms Tania D'Almelio, referring to the dissolution of Congress said: "This is an illegitimate measure by an illegitimate government." She and others were reported to be planning to go to Congress tomorrow to hold a session. However good the intentions of the interim administration, it will inevitably find itself in contradictions because its legal grip on power is fundamentally flawed.

It must not be forgotten too that the Latin American countries have not received the news of Mr Chavez' ouster with any visible enthusiasm. The nineteen-member Rio Group, for example, has already condemned "the interruption of constitutional order." At this stage, it seems unlikely that official recognition for the new government will be forthcoming for the new Venezuelan government from most South American nations.

And what about Venezuela's relations with Guyana? A government which has not secured official recognition from the rest of Latin America and which in any case is interim in nature, is not likely to be very adventurous on the foreign affairs front. Under normal circumstances, therefore, presuming it remains in office until the promised elections, and barring any dramatic developments, one might expect some expressions of cordiality from west of the border and some maintenance diplomacy, but no unusual new initiatives. Certainly the traditional Venezuelan position on the border is not going to change.

For her part, Guyana will have to consider whether she will follow the Latin states in continuing diplomatic relations but not affording official recognition to the new government, or whether she should break ranks. Whatever is decided, there clearly should be no new initiatives from this side given the temporary nature of the Venezuelan administration.

All of this will be academic, of course, if there is turmoil to the west. It is about time that the Guyana Government sat down and did some serious contingency planning for the various eventualities which might emerge. Even if the Venezuelan interim government manages to carry the country to the polls without any major hitches, the actions of the former President, and the events of April 11/12 may leave scars which could have long-term repercussions for the stability of the country's political framework. And that has implications for us.

The immediate question of concern in Georgetown is the one of oil, and whether the oil agreement signed with the previous government will be upheld. In the case of Cuba, it has already been abrogated, but we are not in the same category as Cuba, of course. Presumably the Guyana Government is hoping that the force majeure declared on April 10 in relation to petroleum shipments to Guyana on account of the PDVSA strike, will now be lifted. Even if it is, however, the implications of oil dependency on Venezuela over the long term still need to be reviewed.