Outfitting the army
Editorial
At one of his recent press conferences, Head of the Presidential Secretariat, Dr Roger Luncheon, stated that the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) had not made any "additional demands" to improve its capability. Dr Luncheon was answering a question which had been asked in the context of Guyana's national security and because of acts by Venezuela which had been deemed intimidatory and which flowed from that country's claim to Essequibo. Guyana's army is a David to Venezuela's Goliath, which includes a national guard, coastguard with high-speed boats and an air force with the latest in fighter jets and helicopters. A country's defence force is its bulwark both in peace time and war. Guyana's army mans sea and land borders, but one may as well ask why, since it has not the capacity to do much more than watch. Contemporaneous equipment for the army ought to be budgeted for each year. Surely no one can be more aware of this than Dr Luncheon, who is Secretary to the Defence Board. To decide what type of equipment is needed a decision needs to be made on the best way to deal with the Venezuelan threat. Suggestions to locate the headquarters of the army in Essequibo make no sense. There is ultimate civilian control of the army and the headquarters should remain in the capital city, near the seat of government. However, it may be a good idea to station more soldiers in Essequibo. Perhaps the most sensible policy is to have a number of well armed border outposts that can give early warning of any hostile military moves and provide some resistance while world opinion is mobilised. One doubts, however, whether Venezuela is likely to mount an invasion. It is much more likely to indulge in a series of harassments, testing the water so to speak, as it is doing now by placing advertisements in certain Caribbean newspapers stating its case on the border issue. If border outposts are considered the best bet that would partly dictate the kind of equipment needed. Obviously there is a need for basic items like helicopters and radar equipment. Our coastguard only manages to capture perhaps one out of every 20 vessels that fish illegally in Guyana's Exclusive Economic Zone. And while a monetary value has not been placed on this depletion of our marine resources, one only has to read the list of the catch on the vessels caught to have an idea. High seas pirates too, acting with complete impunity, have been swooping down on unsuspecting fishermen and leaving them adrift and empty-handed. A committee headed by Dean in the Faculty of Agriculture at the University of Guyana, Dr Pooran Persaud, which was mandated to formulate strategies to curb illegal fishing in Guyana's EEZ, has drafted a policy document which the cabinet is to review. The committee's report recommended, among other things, that an initial fleet of six vessels be procured for the coastguard--three patrol and three faster boats to chase pirates and illegal fishing vessels. Approval of this would be a start. The coastguard also needs more personnel and other equipment and better salaries. Ditto for the rest of the GDF. The size of the army has been curtailed for good economic reasons since the time of the Hoyte government. However, this has created its own problems. Because of its present size the promotion of officers is stymied. Officers become eligible, but remain in the same position for years due to a lack of scope. Nevertheless, many of these officers have remained in the GDF. Some time ago government took the decision to second some of these officers to the public service to deal with specific projects. Some five officers were seconded. And though contracted, the GDF still has a cadet officer training programme, which is said to be on par with what is offered in the United Kingdom and Canada. This programme is the only one available in the English-speaking Caribbean and has the advantage of being relevant to the needs of Caribbean armies. Hence, almost every course run in the recent past has had cadets from among our neighbours. The GDF also collaborates with the armies of the Caribbean, the United States of America and the UK in the annual `Operation Tradewinds'. But as regards equipment, it's long past the time for the army and the government to play catch up. Indeed in his recent 30th anniversary message Major General Joe Singh raised the issue discreetly, as he does most years at the annual officers conference. Dr Persaud's report also recommended that central government approach friendly governments to acquire the equipment required for the coastguard as gifts. It recommended that funds raised through fines and the sale of confiscated assets should go into a special account and be used to offset operational and maintenance costs of the equipment. In the same vein, can governments like the UK and US not be appealed to to channel some of their armies' surplus here? Perhaps even Caribbean governments would do so in return for the excellent training their officers receive here. And what about a GDF business arm? The army already rears chickens and pigs. Can it not broaden these farms to operate on a commercial basis, employing civilians and putting money in its coffers? Outfitting the GDF with modern equipment would certainly boost morale. First a policy decision is needed on how best to tackle the defence of our border. The illegal plunder of Guyana's mineral resources would also be curbed.
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