Editorial
Stabroek News
April 12, 2001

As Georgetowners surveyed the still smouldering ruins of a portion of the city's commercial heartland last Tuesday morning, it must have struck them how symbolic it was of the wasteland of Guyana's politics. There is nothing, but nothing that has happened in the past eight-and-a-half years which could justify that. Including what happened outside the Office of the President on Monday. The destruction of property, the destruction of investment, the destruction of hope is not a tactic with a purpose, it is an expression of nihilism. It is as if the society - or more properly, portions of it - has been infected with a kind of madness.

And standing in the middle of the madness is the thin, blue line of the Guyana Police Force. Underpaid, undermanned, undertrained and indifferently led, it is currently required not merely to keep the peace, but to exercise a certain nicety of judgement in some extremely sensitive situations. One of those occurred on April 9 outside the Office of the President. It need not have occurred at all. But owing to a total lack of foresight on the part of the police, for which Commissioner Lewis himself must take ultimate responsibility, a scenario was allowed to develop which the police then mishandled so badly that it set in motion a train of events which has cost us dearly.

It must be said that the police did not cause this situation. They were simply the trigger for a sequence of actions which changed the political landscape radically from what it had been on Sunday night. It must be repeated too that what the police did in no way justifies what happened subsequently. Having said that, however, it is clear that Commissioner Lewis needs to meet with his senior officers and review police strategy and tactics. They are currently being required to operate in a politically charged context, and their guidelines to the ranks must take that into account.

As far as what happened last Monday is concerned, the situation could possibly have been avoided altogether if the police had simply sealed off New Garden street at an early stage. Sealing off does not mean barriers across the road manned only by one or two ranks. Sealing off means enough manpower to prevent access to protestors. The upper police echelons knew better than anyone else that the PNC REFORM had already been protesting against the appointment of Dr Luncheon as Head of the Presidential Secretariat. The fact that on earlier occasions the demonstrators had not been led by Mr Robert Corbin does not mean that the police could have rested easy in the assumption that the PNC leadership would not have come out on the road before the official march scheduled for Tuesday. In their planning sessions the senior officers should have entertained the possibility of all kinds of eventualities.

When Stabroek News arrived in New Garden street at around 9:30am on April 9, there were about 80 protestors standing around with placards. The barriers at the South road end of the street were in place, while one of those at the Regent street end had been moved aside. Mr Corbin was sitting with some others on the bridge leading to the Presidential Secretariat, and the few police on the scene were standing around, some amicably talking to the crowd.

From that point until about three-quarters of an hour later when the riot squad arrived, the number of protestors was steadily augmented by people coming in via the Regent street end. They did not arrive all at once; they just trickled in over the period unimpeded by the forces of law and order, so that eventually the scattering of officers on the scene was faced with a much more sizeable crowd than had been the case only an hour before.

Despite the fact that the area had not been sealed effectively at the outset, the police still had the opportunity to call for reinforcements before the numbers built up. Was no one equipped with a radio? Was headquarters not advised that extra manpower was needed? Was it not told that the Chairman of the PNC was sitting on the bridge? It surely could have been anticipated that Mr Corbin's presence in itself would have attracted more protestors to the site than otherwise would have been the case. What instructions exactly were given to the ranks at the scene by their seniors?

In the event, as we all now know to our cost, the Tactical Service Unit was called out. Why that was thought necessary in a sensitive situation is not too clear. The protestors were unarmed and peaceful. After the riot squad arrived, the usual taunts started, but the demonstrators were not guilty of any physical assaults. In a situation where no acts of violence were involved, it would have been more appropriate if ordinary police reinforcements had been sent.

Mr Corbin and Mr Khan, of course, were guilty of provocation when they ignored the police requests to move after the TSU arrived, and then proceeded to lie down on the bridge, but the police should have calculated for that reaction. At that point the forces of law and order had cornered themselves into a position where either they had to remove the demonstrators, or else they had to leave them alone. And having called out the riot squad, they couldn't leave them alone.

Although by that time, circumstances had committed the police to moving the protestors, surely the Police Commissioner cannot defend the level of violence which was used against both the Chairman of the PNC, the Chairman of the Reform and the others. It is not as if he can contradict the accusations of brutality, when footage of this was shown in all too vivid technicolour on the evening newscasts. While in human terms the assault on Mr Corbin is no worse than an assault on anyone else, in political terms it carries an altogether different penalty. Why were the protestors not lifted bodily one by one? If at that point they had attacked the police, then at least the police would have had some excuse for a more robust response. While a more patient approach might have been tiresome, it might not have produced the same consequences.

The final act - it bordered on farce - was the summoning of the black-clothes police, who appeared after the protestors had already been dispersed. There were small groups of people from Foreign Affairs and elsewhere around, who had gone down into the street after the action was over out of curiosity, while close to Regent street, Mr Patrick Yarde could be seen talking to reporters. Instead of recognizing that their services were not needed, the gentleman in black tore round the corner into New Garden, Jesse James style, jumped out, fired their weapons in the air, and cursed any law-abiding citizen whom they encountered in their path. As for the hapless Mr Yarde, he and the reporters were almost mown down by their vehicle as they zoomed out of the street with the same recklessness as they had zoomed in. All of it, recorded by the relentless video cameras. What on earth were they doing there? One supposes that the nation has to be thankful that they arrived so late.

The Commissioner of Police and his senior officers have to go back to the drawing board to do some more contingency planning. The assessment of a situation cannot be left to the judgement of a junior rank on the ground, and headquarters must constantly monitor their officers in the field. All ranks should be instructed to inform headquarters immediately when known personalities, particularly political leaders, are demonstrating. Most of all, Mr Lewis has to press the Government for adequate funds to train his officers in methods of crowd control.