By David Granger
Stabroek News
March 11, 2001

The best means of measuring our progress as a nation is in the fulfilment of the pledge enshrined in the preamble of the 1980 Constitution:

"...to defend our national sovereignty, to respect human dignity and to cherish and uphold the principles of freedom, equality and democracy and all other fundamental human rights."

The defence of national sovereignty and the protection of citizens' rights are indispensable conditions of statehood which require constant vigilance against challenges and threats.

In Guyana, national defence is the direct responsibility of the President whose ceremonial office of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces - by virtue of section 89 of the Constitution - often obscures the decision-making, forward-planning, and budgetary-balancing required of the two other Presidential posts - Minister of Defence and Chairman of the Guyana Defence Board (GDB).

Bharrat Jagdeo inherited all three titles on 11 August 1999 when he was sworn in as President of the Republic. After less than a year in office, however, he was confronted with the most serious threats to Guyana's territorial integrity since the country became a Republic in February 1970. Shaken by those threats, the Administration has had to modify the national defence policy to which it had adhered since 1992.

The Jagan doctrine

Dr Cheddi Jagan adopted a defence policy of benign neglect when he took office in October 1992. Addressing the Annual Officers' Conference on 15 January 1993, he made no mention of the GDF's need to improve its defence capacity but, instead, called on it "to embark on economic revenue-earning enterprises". Not unexpectedly, as new resources, funding and manpower were not provided for this change, little was achieved either in the Force's unaccustomed revenue-earning role or in improving its operational readiness.

As late as February 1999, President Janet Jagan gave a new spin to the doctrine by declaring that the "fundamental threat" to Guyana was not one of "territoriality and sovereignty, but our tenuous socio-economic stability". She offered the Annual Officers' Conference her vision of the GDF "...evolving to perform a substantial and committed role in law enforcement."

Defence doctrine drifted away from defence issues while the GDF was kept on 'life support'. Although there was an increase in the dollar amounts allocated, funds were provided only to keep abreast of increases in Public Service emoluments and the administrative and logistical needs for feeding, clothing, housing and transporting the troops but were insufficient to procure the resources necessary to perform the Force's vital operational role.

Dire warnings that the Force was incapable of securing the country's 2,500 km long land frontier from incursions, or its maritime EEZ from poachers, smugglers, narco-traffickers and assorted racketeers, were brushed aside. The Guyana People's Militia (GPM) and the Guyana National Service (GNS) were put on the chopping block.

It took the events of year 2000 to bring about change.

Defence policy

The GDF Annual Officers' Conference has been the traditional forum for the President, as Minister of Defence (MoD) and Chairman of the GDB, to present the Administration's statement of defence policy.

In his opening address at the conference held on 5 May 2000 at Camp Ayanganna, Georgetown, President Bharrat Jagdeo reiterated his Administration's commitment to the concept of a small, well-equipped, professional army supported by a larger reserve. He also repeated the promise made on 24 November 1999 when, addressing the commissioning parade of Standard Officer's Course (SOC 32), he assured the GDF that: "My Government is committed to ensuring that adequate resources, within the limits of the State, are available to the Army."

Both assurances were regarded with scepticism as, less than a fortnight later, the para-military operations of the GNS were discontinued and its colours 'laid up' at a service at the Camp Ayanganna Auditorium on 16 May.

The GNS had been launched in October 1974 and constituted something of a youth reserve to the GDF. By discontinuing its para-military operations, the potential 'larger reserve' promised by the President would not be realised.

The GPM, the main military reserve force formed in 1976, had also been slashed to a battalion of a few hundred persons three years earlier in 1997. In effect, the downsizing of both the GNS and GPM had the effect of making the reserve smaller, not larger, than the regular GDF, contrary to the President's assurance.

The month after the President's promises, retiring Chief of Staff Maj Gen Joseph Singh was moved to express the hope that "...there would be a revolution in the minds of our leaders to ensure that our diplomatic efforts are backed by adequate defence capability..."

High command

The source of serious policy should be the Guyana Defence Board which, according to section 9 of the Defence Act is "...responsible under the general authority of the Minister [i.e. in this case President Jagdeo who is the MoD] for the command, discipline and administration of, and all other matters relating to, the [Guyana Defence] Force."

Chaired by the President, the Board is a cabinet sub-committee comprising the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Legal Affairs and including the GDF Chief of Staff and the Commissioner of Police and others. The HPS, who is Cabinet Secretary, is also the Defence Board Secretary.

Little is known about the GDB's deliberations which are secret but, at the height of the military crisis in 2000 it was reported that the Board met on 23 June - three weeks after the CGX incident - for the first time since April.

Positioned awkwardly between the GDB and the GDF is the Office of the President (OP) which performs the duties of a Ministry of Defence but is not structured to do so. The President himself is charged with ministerial responsibility for the OP but, in reality, on account of the President's busy schedule including his retention of the Finance portfolio, the Head of the Presidential Secretariat (HPS) is the man in charge.

The absence of a proper Ministry of Defence has been a serious structural flaw in the national security architecture - an error not made by any of our neighbours. Since the introduction of the executive presidency under the 1980 Constitution, the defence portfolio has been located in the OP and the President has retained chairmanship of the GDB.

There is little to recommend its continuation into the new millennium. National defence has become a major aspect of state expense and effort and demands the competent and undivided attention of a subject minister which a Head of State will be unlikely to give.

Changes in the GDF high command in 2000 were anticipated. Chief of Staff Maj Gen Joseph Singh was due for retirement on his 55th birthday (29 June 2000) and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Col Godwin McPherson, 52, had been suspended from office since 1996 as a result of criminal investigation into his conduct. The GDB signaled its choice for succession by promoting Col Michael Atherly to the rank of brigadier on 1 January 2000, effectively superceding the suspended McPherson.

As it turned out, Maj Gen Singh retired and was sworn in as Chairman of the Guyana Elections Commission on 10 May, clearing the way for Brig Atherly to be appointed Chief of Staff on 15 May. After the criminal charges were dismissed by the court, Col McPherson was forced into retirement on 15 September.

By the end of year 2000, the GDF high command, under the new Chief of Staff, comprised Col Edward Collins (Col GS); Col Lennox Wilson (Col AQ); Col Chabilal Ramsarup (Commander, Infantry); Col Lawrence Paul (Commander, Reserve); Commander Gary Best (Commander, Coast Guard) and Lt Col Enoch Gaskin (Commander, Air Corps).

Defence planning

During 2000, the US Government embarked on a series of steps aimed at expediting the defence planning process in Guyana in accordance with its own hemispheric strategy. The essence of US policy, as far as Guyana was concerned, contained in the document - A National Security Strategy for a New Century - was "...the importance of working with our neighbours to solve problems of great concern to Americans such as drugs, immigration and transnational crime". These issues had been highlighted when President Clinton met Caribbean leaders, including then President Samuel Hinds of Guyana, in Barbados in May 1997.

The first step was the invitation to Defence Board Member and Home Affairs Minister Ronald Gajraj, along with the new Deputy Chief of Staff Brig Michael Atherly and former National Security Adviser Brig (ret) David Granger to attend the Third Education and Defence Seminar hosted by the National Defence University's (NDU) Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) on 12-15 March in Miami. The Seminar was a useful forum for bringing together civilian and military scholars and educators to discuss the changing content of defence studies in the Western Hemisphere.

The second step was an in-country seminar on the theme: "Guyana: Developing a Sustainable National Security Strategy", again, organized by the CHDS, on 26-28 April in Georgetown. This seminar attracted the enthusiastic attendance of about 80 participants from the Government, defence and security forces, and civil society.

This was followed, by the attendance of seven military and civilian Guyanese at the CHDS's resident course at the NDU in Washington, DC, to pursue studies in defence policy planning and administration.

In what, for a while, seemed like an uncommon upsurge of interest in national defence, Ronald Gajraj announced, on 8 July, the appointment of a 15-member committee, the terms of reference and work schedule of which had been agreed to by members. The Committee had its origins in the CHDS-organized in-country seminar and was meant to draft a framework for a national security strategy through a series of consultations. The first meeting, it turned out, would be the last for this National Security Strategy Organisational Committee (NSSOC) under Gajraj's Chairmanship.

There was another flash of hope when, on 28 August, President Bharrat Jagdeo himself convened the Presidential Advisory Committee on Borders (PACB). Comprising cabinet ministers, government officials, serving and retired military officers, and representatives of civil society, the PACB was meant to advise the President on matters affecting the country's territorial integrity. Like the still-born NSSOC of July, however, the PACB of August also never met for a second time in 2000.

By year's end, the State's defence planners allowed the thrust towards formulating a national security strategy, albeit at the urging and initiative of the USA, and a national border policy, to lapse.

Defence resources

Five months after the high seas drama in which Suriname Marine (navy) gunboats forced the expulsion of the Canadian CGX rig which had been licenced by the Guyana Government to explore for petroleum, GDB Secretary Roger Luncheon announced an injection of capital funds to the GDF. Placed alongside the President's commitment in August to recapitalise the Defence Force '...whatever it takes', the response was decidedly modest.

In announcing the allocation of G$545 M (about US$2.9M), Roger Luncheon declared that "the rehabilitation of the [Air Corps] fleet and an increase in the [Coast Guard] fleet will be the sum total of the 2000 intervention." Luncheon was at pains to point out that the total expenditure on defence had moved from $185.5 M in FY 1990 to $2.4 B in FY 2000, capital expenditure increasing from a mere $0.3 M to $447 M. He had announced, earlier, that the Cabinet, on 12 September, had approved an allocation of $806 M to the GDF, but it turned out that the funds would be directed mainly to repairing buildings and buying clothing and equipment.

By year 2000, the GDF was in a position in which nearly all of its land, air and maritime transport needs, including operational deployment and patrols, were met by private contractors and agencies. Over the decade of the 1990s, damaged and unserviceable equipment, including some troop carrying vehicles (TCV), BN-2 Islander light transport aircraft and coastal patrol vessels (CPV), which had served the GDF well during the 1980s, were sold off and never replaced.

To make matters worse, a major catastrophe occurred on the morning of 18 December 2000 when a blast utterly destroyed a GDF ordnance arsenal at Camp Groomes, Loo Lands, on the Soesdyke-Linden Highway, killing three young soldiers and injuring 11 others. It may be impossible to replace the materiel lost.

Another catastrophe occurred when a BN-2 Islander crashed into a mountain in the Pakaraimas while on a flight from Kato to Mahdia on 6 January 2001. Capt Vickram Nandan, co-pilot Lt Floyd Gittens, and passenger Ravindranauth Sharma perished.

Apart from the tragic loss of trained pilots, the Administration's pattern of defence expenditure offered little hope that the lost aircraft would be replaced.

Defence threats

The central national defence concern during year 2000 arose out of Suriname's threat to Guyana's territorial integrity. The flashpoint occurred on 3 June when patrol boats of the Suriname Marine (navy) expelled the Canadian CGX Energy Inc-operated RB Falcon oil rig from Guyana's maritime zone where it had been granted a licence to prospect for petroleum.

Despite a series of meetings between Guyanese and Surinamese negotiators in Canouan (St. Vincent), Port of Spain (Trinidad), Kingston and Montego Bay (Jamaica), Georgetown (Guyana) and Paramaribo (Suriname), the action was never reversed. President Ronald Venetiaan later boasted confidently that his navy was "The power in the [Corentyne] river."

Suriname maintained military pressure on the frontier by reinforcing its police and National Army (Nationaal Leger) detachments in the Nickerie District, seizing Guyanese fishing boats in the Corentyne River and violating Guyana's airspace, seaspace and territory at will and with impunity.

For example, four Surinamese soldiers landed on the foreshore at Corriverton (at the Scotsburg housing area), in the East Berbice-Corentyne Region, at about 07:20 hrs on 25 August, firing shots into the air to disperse the Guyanese crowd which had gathered with bottles and sticks, before reboarding their dinghy and returning to their patrol boat. It took a couple of weeks for the Office of the President's (OP) 'Defence Secretariat' to establish "that the Surinamese Military acted aggressively during an incident involving a Guyanese boat and passengers that ended on the Scotsburg beach", and for the Guyana Government to lodge a formal protest with Suriname over the incursion of its armed military personnel.

Notwithstanding the Corriverton incident, another vessel from the Suriname navy entered Guyana's territorial sea on 13 September, seizing three fishing boats and arresting 15 fishermen in the vicinity of Whim Village on the central Corentyne coast. The men and boats were detained in the Surinamese port town of Nickerie and later released after paying substantial 'fines'.

The threat from Venezuela was equally serious, though unaccompanied by the physical display of force. The Government of Venezuela, on 24 May, issued a statement of its objections to the Guyana Government's agreement with Beal Aerospace Technologies Inc (BAT) for the construction of a satellite launch facility in the Barima-Waini Region, within Venezuela's so-called zona en reclamación. According to Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, his Administration felt that the launch site could be used for military purposes.

By July, President Chávez was also threatening to assert Venezuelan sovereignty over an area which included the territorial sea off the Essequibo, and oil Minister Ali Rodriguez Araque suggested that Venezuela was prepared to grant oil concessions in maritime areas which had not been demarcated unless Guyana suspended offshore exploration rights granted to two American companies - Century and Exxon. Both companies subsequently suspended their operations and withdrew.

During the meeting of South American Presidents in Brasilia, however, President Bharrat Jagdeo announced that he had given the Venezuelan President a copy of the agreement which the Guyana Government had signed with BAT on 19 May in order to convince Chávez that the agreement did not include the construction of a military base in the area. To no avail. Unconvinced, Venezuela maintained its objection and BAT cancelled the Agreement, like Century and Exxon, withdrawing from Guyana.

The threat to Guyana's territorial integrity along its 1,119 km border with Brazil came mainly from the uncontrollable movement of illegal miners, called garimpeiros, who seem to be financed and supported by business elements in Boa Vista in Roraima. In addition, a mining consultant confirmed that 95 per cent of the mining dredges in the Cuyuni, Mazaruni and Potaro rivers were owned wholly, or jointly, by foreigners, mainly Brazilians. The scale in other mining areas may be similar. The tenacity of the garimpeiros and other miners and the incapacity of Guyanese forces to monitor them effectively have resulted in some of the former enjoying undisturbed occupation of parts of Guyana's hinterland.

Problems arise when there are outbreaks of violent criminal activity such as occurred in the environs of Orinduik on 1 February when Brazilian desperadoes robbed a Guyanese miner and opened fire on a Guyanese police station before fleeing across the Ireng River. This, a typical 'border-incident', required the laborious deployment of policemen and troops from Georgetown who, expectedly, arrived too late to be of any use.

USA

The USA had been trying for some years to nudge Guyana's Administration towards the US concept of co-operation in regional defence. Then Chief of Staff Maj Gen Joseph Singh and US Ambassador James Mack signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on 10 January 2000 for the 'fostering of mutual understanding' between the coast guards of the two States and to enhance the skills and competence of the local force.

This was followed by a visit by US Marine Corps General Charles Wilhelm, Commander-in-Chief of the US Army Southern Command, on 26 January 2000, to discuss security matters of bilateral concern, including countering transnational threats such as narco-trafficking and illegal arms transfers.

Nearly a year later, US Coast Guard Vice-Commandant, Vice-Admiral Thomas Collins, visited Guyana on 9-10 January 2001. He met President Bharrat Jagdeo and officers of the Guyana Defence Force and discussed equipment and training assistance from the USA, and other maritime issues - notably, the Maritime Law Enforcement Agreement (MLEA) ('Shiprider Agreement') which, up to that time, Guyana had not yet signed with the USA.

It so happened that, within a week of Vice Admiral Collins's meeting with President Jagdeo, GDB Secretary Roger Luncheon signed a memorandum with US Chargé d'Affaires Andrew Parker, more or less agreeing to the text of the MLEA. The Agreement will now facilitate co-operation within the frameworks of the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the International Law of the Sea. Not least of all, it will provide the basis for the provision of defence materiel (especially boats), technical training and assistance such as was necessary in the wake of the big accidents which have occurred recently in the GDF.

For example, even without the formal Agreement being signed, a three-member military team from the US Southern Command visited Guyana in the wake of the destruction of the arsenal. Lieutenant Colonel Leopoldo Carcio, a burns specialist, examined the injured soldiers and Chief Petty Officers Stephen Jones and Jason Slinkard, explosive ordnance disposal specialists, went to the site to investigate likely causes of the explosion.

But, as far as formal agreements are concerned, little mention has been made by the Administration, so far, of its entering into a Status of Forces Agreement with the USA, under which US Forces in Guyana will be immune from prosecution in Guyanese courts, much the same as members of the corps diplomatique.

In keeping with earlier agreements to foster mutual co-operation, other visits and exercises continued during the year. The US Coast Guard vessel Gentian - the Caribbean International Support Tender - docked at Port Georgetown on 3-5 April with a crew comprising 29 members of the US Coast Guard and 16 of the maritime services of Caribbean states - including Guyana's Coast Guard - as part of a Caribbean-US joint maritime training exercise.

Also, a nine-member medical team from the US Air Force visited for a 14-25 August attachment at the Georgetown Hospital during which it conducted medical lectures and training for local health workers, reopened the skin clinic, and performed Guyana's first coronary angiography.

This was followed by a visit from a 35-member platoon for jungle warfare training at the GDF's Jungle and Amphibious Warfare Training School at Makouria, Essequibo, on 17-31 August. Simultaneously, 35 members of the GDF visited Fort Campbell, Kentucky, for joint training with an infantry unit of the 101st Airborne Division of the US Army in a joint exercise funded by the US Southern Command.

UK

In the wake of Suriname's expulsion of the Canadian CGX oil rig to which Guyana could not mount a credible maritime response, Her Majesty's Navy sailed to the rescue by agreeing to sell Guyana the 16-year-old converted minesweeper, HMS Orwell, for about G$400.5 M.

The ship, to be manned by 9 officers and 46 ratings, will most likely be used in fisheries protection and surveillance operations in Guyana's EEZ.

The UK bequeathed Guyana an untidy maritime demarcation problem with the Netherlands when it withdrew in 1966; the minesweeper will do little to resolve the issue in the long term.

The Netherlands

Soon after Suriname's 25th anniversary of Independence celebrations in November 2000, it was announced that Defence Minister Jan Pronk of The Netherlands had discussed with Suriname's Defence Minister Ronald Assen, the possibility of funding a commission of arbitration to resolve the Guyana-Suriname maritime controversy within five years. Guyana's Foreign Minister Clement Rohee, however, denied that The Netherlands had approached Guyana on the matter.

Given the intractable character of the controversy and British and Dutch culpability in failing to settle it during their colonial era, it would be a welcome contribution to peace and security in the region.

France

During the year, the GDF also enhanced its friendship with French forces in the Antilles and Guyane. Under a bilateral agreement, the French naval vessel La Capricieuse visited Port Georgetown on 25-29 May and this was followed by a visit of Brigadier-General Bourdonnée of the French Armed Forces on 5-8 June, during which he met President Jagdeo and senior officers of the GDF and toured the Training School at Makouria.

RSS

Guyana maintained its place as a regional defence player when 35 members of the GDF and 11 members of the Guyana Police Force (GPF) travelled to Puerto Rico on 26 March to participate in 'Tradewinds 2000' military manoeuvres.

Conducted annually by UK and US armed forces, the series of exercises is aimed at the 7-country Regional Security System (RSS) and other Caribbean defence forces.

PRC

Defence co-operation with the People's Republic of China (PRC) was revived by two events. First was the pursuit of advanced military studies from August to December 2000 by Major George Lewis of 21 Artillery Company, at the National Defence University of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Beijing.

Second, during a visit by a delegation comprising Snr Colonel Xu Junping, Jnr Colonel Lu Zhinan, Majors Tian Feng and He Wei and Lieutenant Huang Xiaomin, GDB Secretary Roger Luncheon and PRC Ambassador Wu Zhenglong signed an agreement, on 7 December, under which the PRC will donate US$350,000 worth of military materiel to Guyana.

Geopolitics

The diplomatic, economic and military misfortunes and reverses which afflicted Guyana in year 2000 precipitated a crisis in defence policy. The challenges posed by Suriname and Venezuela in the Atlantic Ocean and the realization that there were real economic costs to Guyana, were the main factors which motivated change.

The big question which now seems to be facing defence policy-makers is not whether Guyana can afford to have a proper defence force and coast guard but whether it can afford not to have them. It has become all too clear that a sovereign State which is incapable of guaranteeing the security which investors need will attract no attention in a competitive international environment. Dollars, simply, will migrate to less risky areas.

Defence planners still need to abandon parochial ideas of regarding the GDF as a big riot squad, ready to support police law enforcement activities such as catching common criminals and quelling street protests.

Guyana's vast seaspace and hinterland must also be made safe, not only for posterity but also for economic prosperity. In this regard, diplomacy must be harnessed to defence. Relations with the three neighbouring states - Brazil, Suriname and Venezuela - and with the RSS, and the big powers - France, UK, USA, The Netherlands and PRC - must be preserved to protect the State's strategic and economic interests.

In this regard, it is a pity that the announcement made in October 1996 to appoint Colonels Harry Hinds, Michael Atherly and Joseph Harmon as non-resident military attachés to Brasilia, Caracas and Paramaribo, respectively, was never put into practice. Both Hinds and Harmon have retired and Atherly has become Chief of Staff without any indication of whether their functions have been transferred. Despite the very limited role non-resident officers could play, it was hoped that, at least, their appointment would have led to an attempt to harmonise diplomacy with defence concerns.

In the final analysis, President Jagdeo's decisions to increase defence spending and sign on the dotted line to defence agreements with the USA, though necessary, will be insufficient to guarantee Guyana's peace and safety.

Guyana still needs to get down to the business of drafting its own national defence strategy, steered not by old domestic antagonisms but by the current challenges of the geopolitical environment and to building strong alliances which can ensure its peace and safety. Defence policy in the new century must be driven by a new thinking and serious planning by people who recognise the changes taking place on our frontiers, who understand that the "fundamental threat" to any State is any attack on its territoriality and who appreciate the old adage that, like liberty, the price of security is external vigilance.