Justice and revenue are closely connected

by Eusi Kwayana
Stabroek News
March 19, 2000


All those who were willingly or unwillingly grounded in English history remembered the historians finding that justice and revenue were closely connected. It was a way of describing the habit of the English courts to expand jurisdiction in order to increase revenues coming to the government.

There is another kind of relationship between justice and revenue in the Cooperative Republic. A comparison between the way the Canadians converted their Customs and Revenue Departments into a Revenue Agency and the way Guyana did the same thing is instructive. It will show that in Canada there seemed to be a basic respect for process and for the gains won by employees over the years. Yet it was clear from the Canadian legislation that Canadian revenue departments had similar problems to the Guyana administration to deal with.

It will of course be argued that Guyana is unlike Canada a 'developing' country - or one which ought to be developing - whereas Canada is far more qualified as a 'developing country' than Guyana and this is true. But the apology for ruthless measures in developing countries is the same logic which many of us once accepted that led to the harvest of one party states in Eastern Europe and most of the countries of Africa, certain Asian and Middle eastern societies.

Our leading government spokespersons have told us all about where and where the Revenue Authority has succeeded the Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue Departments. We have been told that the Guyana Revenue Authority Act has been modelled largely on the Canadian Act. It is true that in April 1999 the Canadians converted their Ministry of National Revenue into Canada Customs and Revenue Agency. They did it in such a way that they maintained all the skills which the departments had nurtured. Our legislation is so unlike theirs that as this is written on March 1, 2000 our newspapers carry advertisements for key posts in the new Revenue Authority.

Let us confine the comparison of these two transition schemes to personnel. It is known that the Customs and Excise has seldom been discussed without mention of corruption. So when some officers are transferred from Customs to the new Authority, when others are transferred to other places in the Public Service and when some are sent on compulsory retirement, who can blame the public for drawing conclusions according to the type of treatment each group of former employees received?

The Guyana Revenue Authority Act has one single provision for existing employees of the Customs and Excise Agency and the Inland Revenue Department. It provides:

"6 (1) Before the appointed date, the Government shall notify such of the employees of the Departments as it wishes to retain for the purpose of transfer to the Authority and such employees shall be engaged on terms and conditions in relation to their emoluments as may be agreed upon between the Authority and the person so employed and which taken as a whole are no less favourable than those applicable to him immediately before the date and shall in respect of any person so employed be the successor of the Government with regard to his leave or superannuation rights or benefits, whether accrued, earned, inchoate or contingent.

(2) Employees not engaged under subsection (1) shall before the appointed date be notified to that effect by the Government and may be retained by the government."

Apart from the difficulty of guessing who or what "shall be the successor of the Government" this provision is clear enough. It gives to the Government rights to dispose of the previous employees "as it wishes." Secondly, it "may" but not "shall", retain the others. It is silent of compulsory retirement. But that is implied. "It may retain" also means "it may not retain." In this there is a resemblance with privatisation and in fact some like myself have seen this move as party privatisation.

Reference to the Canadian Act on these points may help us to judge the real objectives behind the scheme of the law and the actions so far taken. I have myself struggled with the problem why a government mainly interested in efficiency will expel all the practised Customs skills from the Revenue Authority and trust its efficiency to greenhorns. It did so without attempt at explanation.

In the Canadian process, similar problems must have posed themselves. Perhaps because of the varied type of economy there, compared to Guyana, they did not loom as large in the public debate and the political competition. But they were certainly there.

Yet, how did Canada treat the problem of transition? And make no mistake. The Canadian Act does not strip the Minister of the function of remote oversight. Rather, it allows the Minister to delegate ministerial functions to Revenue officials, rather than transfer these functions out altogether.

Under section 91 of the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency Act every previous employee with public service tenure was (a) offered the same job under the new Authority and (b) terminated as an employee of the Ministry of Revenue. The following other provisions amplified the change.

* An employee had sixty days to refuse the new job. If the employee did not refuse the offer, the transfer to the new Agency was complete.

* Another officer who refused the job offer was entitled to receive benefits and severance pay, but the obligations of "accumulated severance" were transferred to the new employer, the Revenue Agency.

* Officers of the Executive Group were treated similarly.

* A person whose employment was terminated under Paragraph 11(2) (f) or (g) of the Financial Administration Act before the day on which section 91 comes into force and who was reinstated by the Public Service Staff Relations Board after that day becomes an employee of the Agency on the day of reinstatement.

* There are some features of the establishment of the Revenue Authority which are disquieting.

I have always supported every drive against corruption. These have been rare indeed and as in the distant past so in the present - intended for attacks on 'enemies' or 'rivals.'

The only safe standard for the public to adopt is the standard of proof. If persons found not guilty by a court are found guilty by the government on the same accusations, where are we going?

During the debate on the Revenue Authority Bill, many saw the Bill as one which could set the pace in dismantling the Public Service as an Institution not controlled by the present government, government of the day. The Lands Commission Act is similar in content and intention. It runs along the lines of Mr Burnham's famous declaration in Jamaica in 1973, "We are running a one party state in a multi-party system." Today we are bombarded with claims of building democracy.

Changing the structure of the state - reinventing government - is one thing and is very popular in certain places. It can also be useful, if it does not mean stripping away all the rights people have reasonably come to expect.