'Blackie' siege estimated at $80M
|
'Blackie' siege estimated at $80M
- operation not well co-ordinated
- observers
Stabroek News
February 13, 2000
To the trained eye the estimated $80 million, 11-hour siege which ended in the death of Linden 'Blackie' London as he emerged from his Toucan Guest House fortress hideout was not properly co-ordinated as the police and army units were in roles other than those they should have played in a joint operation.
Sources have put the cost of the operation at some $80 million, which includes damage to the guest house and surrounding properties, and ammunition and overtime pay, among other expenses. Joint operations from the 1950s onwards were carried out by the army (usually British troops) and the local police, with the officer in charge of the army unit in charge of the operations. This custom has continued in peacekeeping operations, because the military are only called in when the police cannot deal with a situation.
According to knowledgeable sources, in a situation like the one which obtained at the Toucan Guest House, the senior police officer would have remained in command, but would have deferred to the senior army officer once it had been perceived that a certain type of weaponry would have to be utilised. Also, given the capability of London, who was a trained soldier skilled in close quarters combat and operations in built-up areas, it would have been recognised that this was a job for the army.
Observers with experience of military operations at the scene believe that the military should have been in charge of cordoning off the area with the police concentrating on flushing London out. The construction of the building, which gave the maximum assurance of safety to its occupants, proved an unexpected challenge to the tactics, first of the police and later of the army. Instead of being built of hollow concrete blocks as one would have expected, the walls of the hotel were solid cast, a throwback to the days when builders were builders. Its configuration provided just one exit to each apartment. Each of the self-contained apartments was bunker-like: solid inner walls, grilled windows and doors with the air-conditioning unit encased in a grilled frame. The ground floor apartment which London occupied provided him with several openings from which to fire, and which he skillfully used to give the impression that there was more than one person in the building. But this advantage was at the same time a disadvantage as there was only one way out of the building.
Observers also believe that if the army was given the role of storming the building, the police should have been withdrawn to an outer ring. This disposition, they feel, would have facilitated unity of command and the objective of the exercise would have been clear to all those involved. As it was, the police seemed to have been operating under one set of instructions, while the army was functioning under another.
The decision to use anti-tank missiles to breach the walls seemed not to have been based on detailed knowledge of the layout of the apartment in which London was cornered, the observers said.
The missiles fired did not breach the walls where London was holed up and he was flushed out only by the fire which they caused.
With the building set ablaze above him, London had but two choices - to remain in the room and be incinerated or to exit. In exiting the room, the choices were stark; face certain death if he came out firing or surrender knowing that he could very well be killed. London was aware of these choices and was persuaded to surrender without killing himself or going out in a blaze of glory. In surrendering, he took the gamble that the army personnel could have ensured he would be taken alive.
Sources were divided in their opinion as to whether London had to be persuaded to exit the building. Some felt that with the building alight he would have had to emerge anyhow, though there was the distinct possibility that he would have tried to take out as many as he could before dying. Others felt that persuading him to throw his weapons out and surrender obviated the risk of a shootout. The negotiation was done in the hearing of all and sundry at the scene--police, army and spectators--but sources say it is not clear whether the police and army were at one as to what should happen if London surrendered. Military culture dictates that where a person surrenders he is taken alive unless he acts in a manner which indicates that surrender is just a deception.
According to Police Commissioner, Laurie Lewis, the ordinary police cannot take on dangerous criminals like London and special squads are detailed to take them in. A statement by the police said that both they and the army were prepared to take London dead or alive, and at his press conference last Wednesday Police Commissioner Laurie Lewis said that a special unit had been deployed at the Toucan Guest House.
